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Judging in the 
Age of Technology
By Fredric I. Lederer
When a judge sits in judgment over a fellow man, he  
should feel as if a sword is pointed at his own heart.1
It has never been easy to be a judge. Socrates allegedly opined: “Four things belong to a judge: to hear courteously, to answer wisely, to consider soberly, and to decide impartially.”2 Of course, an Athenian judge did not have to worry about her com-
puter crashing, e-discovery, the ISP (Internet service provider) search warrant, that 
pesky invasion-of-privacy drone suit, and whether counsel’s iPad would communicate 
with the courtroom display system without splashing the judge’s iPhone wallpaper all 
over the courtroom monitors.
It is inherently difficult to extrapolate the effects of technological change on soci-
ety, and the problem is not a new one. At the first international urban-planning 
conference in 1898, experts were certain 
that New York City would cease to be 
inhabitable in the future because of the 
manure that would be produced by the 
number of horses that would be needed to 
support the [correctly] estimated future 
population size.3 Predicting the future is 
risky. Accordingly, I thought that it might 
be useful to take a moment and offer a 
“snapshot” of present reality from a judge’s 
perspective and then make the argument 
that technological competence is or soon 
will be a requirement for judges.
Contemporary Life for a 
Technology-Oriented Judge
Today’s judge may rise to the alarm of 
one’s smartphone, check e-mail in the 
shower,4 and then read the newspaper on 
the larger tablet screen, possibly while 
watching the refrigerator monitor noting 
the need to buy cream. Then it is off to 
the courthouse, idly wondering whether 
Google’s self-driving car will allow the 
judge in the future to catch up on the 
morning’s cases during the commute. 
Assuming no cell phone interruptions—
and surely no texting—the judge parks at 
the courthouse and uses the judge’s 
entrance, avoiding the lawyer’s need for 
security screening. Once in chambers, it 
is a quick check of the case management 
system, then a brief moment to check 
Facebook. That pain of a lawyer wants the 
judge to friend him. Given conflicting 
professional ethics opinions,5 it is a poor 
idea. Besides, if the lawyer had been in 
court, he probably would have asked the 
judge for a selfie from the bench. A 
moment’s check on LinkedIn and Martin-
dale.com, left over from the judge’s days 
as a lawyer, shows some interesting com-
munications. Have to check those later.
First, motion practice. Following an 
inaugural experiment by Jefferson Parrish 
in Louisiana, the judge hears the first two 
motions remotely, using WebEx. Video 
and sound are okay, but maybe the court 
ought to upgrade to a dedicated software-
based video platform such as the Cisco 
Jabber. This program was used a few years 
ago by the Center for Legal and Court 
Technology (CLCT) in an experiment 
with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
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Sixth Circuit in which all three of the 
panel’s judges appeared remotely by com-
puter from their chambers in different 
courthouses for an experimental argu-
ment. It is time for trial and the 
courtroom, but first there is an irritating 
buzz from the smartphone. The judge’s 
dentist has texted with a reminder of an 
upcoming cleaning appointment. Mutter-
ing with aggravation, the judge pauses to 
wonder whether texting could be used to 
remind defendants of court dates, espe-
cially in traffic cases.
It is a personal injury civil jury trial in 
the court’s technology-augmented trial 
courtroom. The judge reviews prior hear-
ings using the case management system 
and the customized judicial dashboard. 
Counsel begin trial via opening state-
ments with vivid images displayed on the 
courtroom monitors, all exchanged among 
court and counsel previously, pursuant to 
court rule. No unnecessary mistrials in this 
court. Counsel then present their evi-
dence via iPads and convertible laptops. 
The judge has noticed a greater interest 
in counsel using technology so long as that 
technology is “bring your own device,” 
especially if it is an iPad. After all, high-
quality trial practice software such as 
TrialDirector and TrialPad are on the 
iPad. For that matter, most of the judge’s 
colleagues and friends have tablets and, 
when possible, use them in lieu of more 
traditional computers. Even Corel Word-
Perfect is now available on the iPad. The 
judge has heard that Australian jurists may 
be experimenting with tablets for jury 
monitors.
Plaintiff ’s third witness speaks only 
Mandarin Chinese. No problem; the city 
has a centralized court interpreter’s center 
and a remote Mandarin interpreter is 
online within two minutes. Of course, the 
court had reserved the interpreter for trial. 
“Taking pot luck” with unscheduled inter-
pretation is done only as necessary in 
criminal arraignments when the interpret-
er’s center is staffed to handle languages 
that customarily are needed regularly.
The defense team has a new lawyer, 
who is unable to hear. No problem; at 
counsel’s request and in lieu of a remote 
American Sign Language interpreter, the 
court has arranged for a real-time feed 
from the court reporter to counsel’s 
devices. Stenographic and voice writer 
reporters are alternating in taking the ver-
batim record, an unusual luxury. Absent 
the need to supply counsel with near 
instant transcription, the judge’s court 
record manager might have elected to use 
the digital audio and video court record 
instead, especially as remote transcription 
can be obtained in as little as about 15 
minutes. The assistive technology is reas-
suring. The judge has had a tentative 
diagnosis of macular degeneration in the 
left eye. CLCT work has shown how to 
use technology and even a court explica-
tor6 to cope with limited vision on the 
part of trial participants. The judge pauses 
for a moment to ponder what a judge 
ought to do if the jury pool includes a 
blind person who wishes to sit. Certainly, 
the juror ought to be competent for at 
least most cases. After all, it is not clear 
that visual demeanor “evidence” really is 
very useful or, if it is, whether it can be 
replaced by what may be alternative senses 
such as hearing.
Plaintiff ’s next witness examination is 
boring in the extreme. The judge wonders 
whether use of Google Glass might let the 
judge unobtrusively read a novel. Perhaps 
unfortunately, however, counsel’s sudden 
evidentiary objection focuses the judge’s 
attention immediately. Plaintiff has asked 
the witness to confirm that a plastic model 
of the device that allegedly injured the 
plaintiff, made by counsel personally on 
her 3D printer, is an accurate, nonwork-
ing scale model of the original device. As 
best the judge can tell, the objection is 
that counsel cannot make her own mod-
els—in her office at that. The judge 
overrules the objection.
Finally, the case is going well, and the 
judge has enough time to think about next 
month’s case. Following the example of 
the bankruptcy court in Delaware that is 
trying a case concurrently with a Cana-
dian court, the judge’s court will jointly 
try a commercial case with a court in Van-
couver.7 The time difference may be 
troublesome.
Lunch brings a text from the judge’s 
younger child. She was working on her 
doctoral dissertation when her hard drive 
failed. She has lost everything on the 
drive and despite the judge’s periodic 
reminders (yes, nagging), the drive was 
not backed up for a year. The only possible 
recourse is an expensive commercial 
recovery company that may or may not 
work. This is even worse than your son-
in-law’s use of a toy helicopter (yes, a 
“drone” with camera) to buzz dogs in the 
neighborhood; at least he is not using it 
to hover outside bedroom windows, or so 
the judge hopes. The judge calls the 
court’s IT chief to ask whether the court’s 
computers, including every court gadget 
the judge uses, are backed up daily. The 
answer is, “Well, maybe; it depends.” That 
spurs the judge’s memory of a disturbing 
Time magazine article about the ease of 
hacking into computers.8 The judge calls 
the IT head again, this time to ask: “Are 
our computers secure from hacking; do we 
have any ‘zero-day’ exploit weaknesses?” 
The uncertain response is not reassuring. 
The judge’s AndroidWear smartwatch 
reminds the judge that court is about to 
start, and the judge returns to the bench 
with an upset stomach that is not due to 
the instant mashed potatoes in the judges’ 
dining room.
Happily, the rest of the trial appears 
straightforward, except for the need to 
resolve a hearsay objection. Counsel 
insisted on displaying case law and pages 
from a law review article to the judge on 
the judge’s monitor. It was a highly persua-
sive effort, and the judge feels compelled 
to rule in counsel’s favor, especially when 
opposing counsel’s only reply is a half-
hearted, “But, Your Honor, it’s not fair.” 
Although the judge is unsure of the accu-
racy of the hearsay decision, the judge is 
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comforted by the knowledge that the court 
record captured the displayed images so the 
appellate court will be able to review them.
Much to the judge’s surprise, however, 
after the midafternoon break, plaintiff ’s 
counsel moves to present 3D evidence 
using a WolfVision 3D document camera. 
Counsel wants to display plaintiff ’s very 
damaged leg to the jurors. Having 
attended the first known use of 3D evi-
dence at CLCT’s demonstration trial at 
the September 2013 Court Technology 
Conference, the judge realizes that this 
raises an unfair prejudice problem. The 
brick used at the CLCT trial had been 
incredibly impressive with its jagged edges 
and bloody hair. Raising the Rule 403 
issue and noting that counsel has only a 
limited number of 3D glasses, the judge 
decides that the appellate court will not 
be able to review the record properly and 
denies the request. At the same time, the 
judge reflects internally that press reports 
suggest that in a few years 3D evidence 
will be able to be projected in front of 
each trial participant without preparation 
or difficulty—assuming that Oculus Rift 
does not bring virtual reality into the 
courtroom instead.
Finally, it is time to go home. After 
some preparation for the forthcoming 
meeting on how to protect personal pri-
vacy and personal identifiers when the 
court proudly places all of its records on 
the web for reasons of public transparency, 
the judge anticipates a quiet evening, 
binge watching Orange Is the New Black, 
courtesy of the judge’s spouse’s best friend, 
the family room TiVo. Unfortunately, the 
entertainment is interrupted by a Face-
Time chat with the judge’s grandchild, 
who is reporting how he has been bullied 
mercilessly on the huge teen-oriented 
website to which he seems addicted. Sim-
ple advice like “Stop using the stupid 
website” does not work. The judge knows 
of a number of suicides of teenagers who 
were captured by that website and swayed 
by the comments of thoughtless teens 
posting their mean-spirited replies.
Finally, the judge drifts off to sleep, 
helped by a vibrating bed and ocean noises 
from the judge’s smartphone, thinking 
dreamily that if StarTrek’s Enterprise’s 
transporter system actually existed, the 
judge could materialize across the country 
to hug that grandchild as he needed or, 
failing that, perhaps grab the family and 
teleport to someplace without any tech-
nology at all.
The Effect on Cases
As technology permeates our lives, it also 
affects the types of cases that courts must 
resolve, the procedural and evidentiary law 
to be applied, and the court’s culture.
We could plausibly argue that “noth-
ing is new under the sun” and that 
technology-related problems are simply 
new manifestations of older issues.9 After 
all “peeping drones” or personal injury due 
to a collision with a camera drone is just 
a new manifestation of a traditional prob-
lem. But even if that is true on some 
levels, quantitative differences can be 
qualitative. Electronic discovery is just 
discovery, complete with privilege and 
spoliation issues, but the sheer magnitude 
of e-discovery alone can change every-
thing, especially if inadvertent disclosure 
of privileged material is considered.10 
When a party seeks access to every elec-
tronic device that might have relevant 
data, we are well past trying to find where 
the filing cabinets might be—to say 
nothing of the accompanying costs. In 
June 2014, the Supreme Court recognized 
that the sheer quantity of information, 
much of which is intensely personal, 
means that cell phones are not subject to 
search incident to arrest without a war-
rant or other justification.11 Will not the 
same rationale ultimately affect searches 
of tablets, personal computers, servers, and 
even Internet routers? We have always 
had identity theft, but theft by phishing 
and hacking, including penetration of 
national retailer’s servers, and the modern 
consequences of identity theft are a whole 
new world indeed.
Procedure
The effect of technology on procedure 
remains to be seen. Remote testimony in 
civil cases is increasingly commonplace,12 
including remote appearances in mental 
health commitment proceedings,13 as are 
remote first appearances in criminal cases. 
But is remote prosecution testimony the 
same as “confrontation” for purposes of 
the Sixth Amendment? We have no deci-
sive resolution as yet.14 Remote 
interpretation and remote motion practice 
do not pose the same legal issues as remote 
testimony, but they do unavoidably call 
into question judicial comfort levels. 
Can—should—we move most motion 
practice into the electronic world, with 
public access, in order to save at least law-
yer time (and fees)? Current technology 
makes such practice easy.
Evidence
The interaction between technology and 
evidence is increasingly disturbing. Tech-
nology has given us new forms of 
evidence—and new ways to misuse it. 
DNA evidence for the first time may give 
us some form of evidentiary certainty—
when done properly. But the history of 
forensic science in the courtroom is 
frightening in terms of the amount of 
error we have experienced, whether of 
fundamental science or, more usually, the 
accidental and intentional consequences 
of human error.15 Juries, of course, not 
only trust most “scientific evidence,” but 
the CSI effect causes doubt when such 
evidence is absent.16 Some time ago, I 
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opined that the usual evidentiary rules 
ought to be adequate to deal with digital 
evidence.17 I still believe that I was cor-
rect in the sense that technology-based 
evidentiary issues can be resolved under 
the usual rules. However, as my colleague 
Jeff Bellin has so beautifully pointed 
out,18 applying those rules to unantici-
pated technologies such as Facebook 
posts and Twitter tweets yields unex-
pected and disturbing results. And we 
have not as of yet really had to deal with 
authentication and metadata.
Even if proffered evidence is admitted 
under evidentiary rules, it is unclear whether 
judges or jurors will or should believe that 
evidence given the possibility of technologi-
cal tampering. In 2010, CLCT tried United 
States v. Varic, a one-day experimental (sim-
ulated) prosecution of an American citizen 
charged with attempted slavery19 in which 
nearly all of the evidence was obtained from 
computers, e-mails, and e-mail attach-
ments.20 CLCT’s first conclusion from the 
trial was reassuring. The jury, chosen as well 
as was possible to emulate an average federal 
criminal case jury, had no difficulty follow-
ing and understanding the expert forensic 
IT testimony from the prosecution and 
defense witnesses. However, CLCT’s other 
two conclusions were profoundly disturbing. 
First, it appears that it does not take a great 
amount of IT skill to fabricate persuasive 
false IT evidence. Second, given adequate 
defense experts, it could be exceedingly dif-
ficult to convict a defendant charged with 
an IT crime. The conclusions obviously are 
interrelated. Because of the relative ease 
with which computer data can be altered or 
created, fact finders obviously will be hard 
to convince when faced with an allegation 
of crime. Of course, the CLCT Laboratory 
Trial was a single occurrence, and much 
more work needs to be done, but, if accurate, 
the conclusions drawn from it suggest that 
increased public knowledge of technology 
may bring with it evidentiary distrust. In 
short, technology will complicate the evi-
dentiary landscape.
Culture
Technology changes how trials and hear-
ings are conducted. If nothing else, 
technology-augmented trials and hearings 
tend to be heavily visual in nature. Skilled 
lawyers learn that it is the “content” that 
ordinarily counts, although the quality of 
a lawyer’s presentation remains important. 
Perhaps more importantly, the modern age 
brings with it large amounts of recorded 
images. Cell phones and tablets (and soon 
personal web cams and drones) ensure 
that anything of interest results in pictures 
and audio-video recordings, or, in other 
words, evidence. Trials and hearings will 
become far more visual than ever before. 
At the same time, the likely increase of 
remote video communications suggests 
that although the judge’s function will 
remain unchanged, the way in which 
judging is conducted may well change. 
That in turn suggests the possibility of 
reengineering.
Reengineering
Although technology is a nearly unavoid-
able part of life, we are only now beginning 
to see its long-term effects on the legal 
professions, and the “Great Recession’s” 
effects on legal practice surely were due 
in part to the direct and indirect effects 
of technology.21
Initially, courts largely used technology 
in an effort to improve traditional prac-
tices. Although there have been some 
exciting innovations, to include assisting 
pro se applicants and online minor case 
disposal, by and large, courts still function 
as they did in Jefferson’s time, albeit, we 
hope, more efficiently. We could do more.
As used by CLCT, “reengineering” 
means the process by which an organiza-
tion such as a court first determines its 
actual needs and goals—as distinguished 
from its long-accepted ones—and then 
asks how those can best be achieved in 
the modern world given available tech-
nologies. Conceding that the legal system 
is bound by constitutional constraints 
(statutes can be changed), reengineering 
presents interesting possibilities.22 How 
could we resolve disputes if we were to 
start with today’s tools in mind? Reengi-
neering is never easy—especially when it 
may change the established order and 
threaten people’s jobs. Given our onrush-
ing cultural change, however, perhaps 
judges should consider it.
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Conclusion
Perhaps the most important result of the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals23 was its 
requirement that the judiciary be the 
“gatekeeper” for expert testimony and sci-
entific evidence. In federal cases and then 
in those states that adopted Daubert, 
judges could no longer simply determine 
whether a given principle was “generally 
accepted” in a scientific community. 
Rather, judges now had to understand 
enough science, medicine, engineering, 
and other fields to be able to determine 
whether expert testimony should be 
allowed.24 Numerous judges found it 
appropriate and necessary to address or 
readdress fields they likely had not spent 
much time in since university—if then. 
Daubert unavoidably can involve technol-
ogy, but the impact of technology on 
contemporary life suggests that judicial 
familiarity with technology is likely more 
important than Daubert’s more limited and 
less frequent demands.
Recognizing the impact of technology, 
in 2012, the American Bar Association 
amended Comment 8 to Model Rule of 
Professional Responsibility 1.1., Compe-
tence, to require that
To maintain the requisite knowl-
edge and skill, a lawyer should keep 
abreast of changes in the law and 
its practice, including the benefits 
and risks associated with relevant 
technology.
As our legal system’s leaders and pri-
mary decision makers in our legal system, 
we should expect the same, or better, of 
judges.   n
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